Cross-Asset Briefing · LegaFund Research · 12 May 2026 · Series Launch
When Valuation, Geopolitics and the Energy Buffer Collide
Three independent stress lines are running simultaneously toward historic extremes in mid-May 2026. On Wall Street, equities trade at valuations the market has seen only once in forty-five years — March 2000[1],[19],[20]. In the Persian Gulf, Washington has publicly rejected Iran's peace proposal as “totally unacceptable”, and the ceasefire that has artificially calmed markets since February now sits, in the words of the diplomats involved, “on life support”[2],[3],[4]. And while both pictures harden, global oil reserves are being emptied faster than at any point since the OECD began publishing inventory data[5],[6],[7]. When three such lines hit red levels at the same time, the relevant question is no longer which shock arrives first — it is who carries the buffer when it breaks. Our answer: only price can[6],[9].
Data as of 12 May 2026 · Author: LegaFund AG, Research Desk · Sources at end · Publication LF-CAS-2026-05-12-EN
The Bottom Line
Three uncorrelated stress lines are converging on extremes — US tech valuations at dot-com levels, an Iran peace process Washington has publicly rejected, and global oil reserves drawing down faster than at any point in OECD history. We are reducing cyclical equity exposure, raising cash and ultra-short investment grade, and holding an explicit energy hedge in the portfolio. Our view is invalidated by a durable diplomatic breakthrough in the Persian Gulf or a coordinated SPR-replenishment push from the major industrial economies.[1],[2],[5],[6],[9]
Investment Summary
Seven points that define the setup
- 01Michael Burry — the US investor, founder of Scion Asset Management and best known for his Subprime shorts ahead of the 2007/08 financial crisis — frames the setup mathematically. And the maths is harder to dismiss than the messenger. The S&P 500 Shiller CAPE stands at 39.6, while its long-run mean since 1881 sits around 17. In 144 years, the index has reached today's level exactly once: March 2000. Add a level of concentration that exceeds the dot-com peak itself — the ten largest stocks now account for 36 to 40% of total market capitalisation — and the maths leaves little room for disappointment.[1],[20]
- 02The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index trades 60% above its 200-day moving average — a level the index has never reached in the twenty-five years it has existed. The first half of 2026 is, on an S&P-relative basis, the second-best half-year for semiconductors that Bloomberg has ever recorded. The best was H1 1999. Burry draws the comparison. So do we.[1],[19]
- 03On 11 May, President Trump rejected Iran's counter-proposal — sanctions relief, full Hormuz sovereignty, war reparations in exchange for partial uranium dilution — as “totally unacceptable”. The ceasefire, NBC writes, is “on life support”. Both sides hold maximum positions that cannot be reconciled.[2],[3],[4]
- 04
- 05Inflation is coming back. US CPI rose 0.9% month-on-month in March — the largest monthly print in four years, driven almost entirely by energy. Eurozone HICP jumped from 1.9% to 2.5%, with the ECB staff projection at 3.1% already for Q2. A second wave would force central banks to lean against growth.[10],[12],[13]
- 06The divergence between Fed and ECB is as wide as it has been since the immediate post-Lehman reaction. The Fed signals it will “look through” the energy shock and, per BofA, pushes the first cut into the second half of 2027. The ECB under Lagarde flags “intensified upside risks”, and MUFG expects cumulatively +50 bps of hikes from June. Stagflation is the word both central banks avoid.[17],[18]
- 07When three uncorrelated risks sit at peak levels simultaneously, the loss event is not the sum of the individual probabilities — it is their correlation in the failure chain. Our probability-weighted 12-month expected value for the S&P 500 is around −18%. Specific portfolio implementation requires individual suitability assessment by each recipient.
Who carries the buffer when it breaks — that is what decides, not which shock arrives first.
LegaFund Scorecard
Stress indicators across seven dimensions
We map risk tension across seven independent dimensions and normalise each to a 0-100 scale. Readings between 60 and 80 are warning; readings above 80 have, over the past four decades, almost always preceded a phase of elevated market volatility. The fact that two dimensions currently sit above 85, four between 60 and 80, and only one in the calm zone is precisely what separates this market from August 2018 or February 2020.
Source mix: Bloomberg, FRED, CBOE, ICE, IEA, Convex Trade. 0-39 calm, 40-59 elevated, 60-79 high, ≥ 80 critical.
Catalyst Calendar
The next 60 days decide
Six dates in the next sixty days where all three stress lines — valuation, geopolitics, energy — converge on a single data window. The asymmetry matters: a positive surprise at one of these events costs the bear a controlled drawdown; a negative one can turn the whole market.
Risk chain
From peace rejection to the pump in Stuttgart
Stress line 1 · Valuation
The maths of US tech leaves little room
Michael Burry warned of a dramatic turn in a Substack post on 11 May 2026. His diagnosis is mathematical — and the maths is not refutable, only displaceable in time. The Nasdaq 100 trades at roughly 43x earnings, about 50% above a fundamentally implied 30x. The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index sits 60% above its 200-day moving average — a level the index has never reached in the twenty-five years it has existed. We share the diagnosis without recommending an active short — and that distinction matters. Burry bets on the break; we build capital preservation around the probability that he is right. The underlying maths is robust: at a Shiller CAPEShiller CAPECyclically Adjusted Price-to-Earnings: S&P 500 PE based on inflation-adjusted 10-year average earnings. Long-run mean since 1881 around 17. of 39.6, the median real ten-year S&P return has historically been near zero. A Buffett IndicatorBuffett IndicatorRatio of US equity market capitalisation to GDP. Warren Buffett's rule of thumb: above 200% historically extreme; long-run mean ~85%. at 217% of US GDP has previously been reached only once, in December 1999. And 36 to 40% of index capitalisation sits in ten stocks — concentration that exceeds the dot-com peak itself.[1],[19],[20],[22]
| Metric | Current (May 2026) | Long-run mean | Deviation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shiller CAPE (S&P 500)[20] | 39.6 | ~17 | +133% |
| Buffett Indicator (Mkt-Cap / GDP)[20] | 217% | ~85% | +155% |
| Top 10 S&P weight[20] | 36-40% | ~20% | +80% |
| Nasdaq 100 PE[1] | 43x | ~22x | +95% |
| SOX above 200-day[19] | +60% | ~0% | critical |
| S&P record with 5% 52-w lows[22] | 4th occurrence | extremely rare | critical |
“We are watching history. In equities, that is not a good thing.” — “The unwind will take us to materially lower prices.”
Stress line 2 · Geopolitics
The US and Iran are moving apart, not toward each other
On 11 May 2026, President Trump publicly rejected Iran's counter-proposal as “totally unacceptable”. Tehran had demanded war reparations, full sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of sanctions and the release of frozen assets — in exchange for partial dilution of highly enriched uranium and execution of the remainder in a neutral third state. Washington insists on full dismantling of enrichment facilities and the immediate reopening of the Strait as a precondition. Both sides have therefore stated maximum positions that cannot be reconciled. From the market's perspective, this means Hormuz remains a structural risk-pricing element. Brent at $104 today implies a crisis discount that is being carried entirely by ongoing SPRStrategic Petroleum ReserveUS strategic oil reserve, operated by the DOE. Releases in 2026 cumulatively ~400 mn barrels — historically unique. releases. The moment that effect fades — and it will, because reserves are finite — the price moves freely again.[2],[3],[4]
What Iran demands
Stress line 3 · Reserves
The global energy buffer is melting at record pace
As long as global inventories absorb shocks, price reactions to Hormuz disruptions remain episodic — they come, they go, the market looks through. Goldman Sachs estimates that a one-month full closure with no mitigation adds $15 per barrel in isolation; with full pipeline reserve and SPRStrategic Petroleum ReserveUS strategic oil reserve, operated by the DOE. Releases in 2026 cumulatively ~400 mn barrels — historically unique. release the figure falls to $10. These models, however, implicitly assume there are reserves available to release. That is precisely the question that catches up with the market in summer 2026. With forward coverOECD Forward CoverNumber of days global OECD inventories could absorb current demand. JPMorgan's operational minimum: 24 days; currently ~27. below 24 days, the same shock becomes asymmetrically more expensive — JPMorgan models Brent paths above $120 and full Gulf saturation within twenty-five days. The moment inventory maths takes hold, it overrules expectations maths.[6],[7],[8],[9]
Global OECD stocks around 968 million barrels. At current pace, forward cover reaches the operational minimum of 24 days in late summer 2026.[6]
| Metric | Value | Signal |
|---|---|---|
| Global stocks (OECD)[6] | ~968 mn bbl | low |
| Forward cover (days)[6] | 27 days | below target (30) |
| Operational minimum (JPM)[6] | 24 days | critical threshold |
| Inventory drawdown March 2026[7] | −85 mn bbl | record pace |
| Coordinated SPR releases 2026[5] | ~400 mn bbl | historically unique |
| Hormuz flow reduction[23] | 20 → 3.8 mb/d | largest ever measured |
| Gulf saturation in full closure[9] | 25 days | JPM model |
Inventory maths overrules expectations maths.
Stress line 3 · Reserves
Brent paths · May to Q4 2026
Modelled bands based on JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs and IEA. Not a point forecast.
Transmission
Inflation transmission: US vs. Eurozone
The empirical rule of thumb is robust and has been calibrated since the oil crises of the 1970s: a sustained $10/bbl oil move adds roughly 0.4 percentage points to US headline inflation and 0.3 to 0.4 pp to Eurozone HICP over six to twelve months. Since the start of the war on 28 February, Brent has moved from about $65 to $104 — that is $39 of additional level, or mechanically 1.4 to 1.6 percentage points of additional headline impulse. We see exactly that impulse in the data already. The more interesting question is not whether the wave arrives, but who experiences it first: the United States via direct gasoline and heating-oil prices, or the Eurozone via gas and industrial cost. The answer will set central bank policy — and therefore capital-market prices — for the rest of the year.[10],[12],[13],[18]
Inflation path · projection through Q4 2026
US data: BLS. Eurozone: ECB staff projections March 2026 + Eurostat. Projection paths from April are LegaFund bands based on published central-bank forecasts.
The second inflation shock reaches every balance sheet that still burns energy.
End price
European fuel prices: what consumers and industry pay
The EU average sits at €1.81 per litre gasoline and €1.93 per litre diesel as of 4 May. The diesel peak is €2.37 in the Netherlands; the floor is €1.53 for gasoline in Spain. Since the war began on 28 February, EU gasoline prices are up 13.67% and EU diesel prices up 23.89% — and that is before any actual escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. Germany sits artificially below €2 thanks to the fuel rebate introduced on 1 May (minus 14 cents excise duty, about minus 17 cents gross); without the rebate the German number would read €2.14 to €2.16. That is the political pre-compensation of a shock that has not yet happened. What happens if it does is modelled in the table below the chart.[14],[15],[16]
Fuel prices by country · 4 May 2026, EUR/litre
DE incl. fuel rebate since 1 May. Without the rebate Germany would be around €2.14-2.16. Source: fuel-prices.eu, ADAC.
| Country | Today (diesel) | Stress (Brent 130 USD) | Crisis (Brent 160 USD) | Crisis delta |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany (with rebate) | €1.99 | €2.40-2.55 | €2.85-3.15 | +85-115 ct |
| Netherlands | €2.37 | €2.75-2.90 | €3.20-3.55 | +85-120 ct |
| France | €2.16 | €2.55-2.70 | €3.00-3.35 | +85-120 ct |
| Italy | €2.05 | €2.45-2.60 | €2.90-3.25 | +85-120 ct |
| Spain | €1.74 | €2.15-2.30 | €2.60-2.95 | +85-120 ct |
| EU average | €1.93 | €2.30-2.45 | €2.75-3.10 | +82-117 ct |
Central bank reaction
Fed looks through, ECB has to hike
We see the widest Fed-ECB divergence since the immediate post-Lehman reaction. The Federal Reserve signals it will look through transitory energy shocks and, per BofA, pushes the first cut into the second half of 2027. The ECB is under pressure to lean against imported energy inflation, and MUFG expects cumulatively +50 basis points of hikes from June onwards. This sets up a classic stagflation arc: a strong central bank unable to ease, a weaker one forced to tighten. Short term, this supports the euro; medium term, the growth path weighs on it. None of this is abstract — it is the driver for EUR/USD, Bund-Treasury spreads and, by extension, the Eurozone valuation multiplier for the next twelve months.[17],[18]
- Fed Funds currently 3.50-3.75%; market originally expected 3-4 cuts in 2026.[18]
- BofA pushes first cut to H2 2027; consensus now at most one cut.[18]
- Powell signals “looking through” transitory energy shocks; Q3 wage data is the swing factor.[18]
- USD implication: stronger medium-term, volatile short-term.[18]
Scenarios · 12 months
Four paths, one common risk factor
We think in four scenarios because binary bull-bear narratives do not do justice to the complexity of this setup. The probabilities are subjective but calibrated: Brent paths follow JPMorgan and Goldman sensitivities, CPI paths follow ECB projections and BLS data. What matters is the asymmetry between bull and bear — we lose more in stress than we gain in success.[8],[9],[10],[12]
| Scenario | P | S&P 500 | EuroStoxx 50 | Brent | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull · Hormuz opens, tech holds | 15% | +5 to +10% | +8 to +12% | 70-85 USD | [2] |
| Base · gradual mean reversion | 50% | −15 to −25% | −10 to −18% | 95-115 USD | [8],[12] |
| Bear · tech correction + Hormuz stress | 30% | −30 to −40% | −25 to −32% | 120-140 USD | [9],[19] |
| Tail · full closure + Mag-7 reset | 5% | −45 to −55% | −35 to −42% | 150-180 USD | [9],[23] |
Risk attribution
Path to the −18% expected value
We decompose the expected 12-month S&P 500 path into its drivers. Multiple compression dominates: a Shiller CAPE reversion from 39.6 to 30 is worth roughly minus 24% in isolation. EPS revisions from AI-capex normalisation, an additional geopolitical risk premium and a moderate stagflation tail add up to roughly minus 30%. Bull offsets — a China stimulus surprise, a technical recovery in the second half — absorb about twelve percentage points of that, because a tail scenario is not the modal path. The probability-weighted expected value lands at minus 18%.
Methodology: multiple compression from CAPE reversion to 30; EPS revision from a 25% AI-capex normalisation assumption; risk premium from Brent path differential; stagflation tail from 1970s episode analysis.
Self-critique
Risks to our view
We attack our own assumptions before anyone else does. Four scenarios in which our defensive bias would lead to underperformance over the next twelve months — and two conditions whose realisation would turn our view.
Sudden Iran settlement (P ≈ 15%)
An unexpected diplomatic breakthrough — say, Chinese mediation in the framework of a Xi-Trump summit — reopens Hormuz, removes the volatility premium from Brent and produces rapid normalisation. Brent falls below $80, equities rally 8 to 12% within weeks, and our defensive positioning underperforms materially.
AI productivity boost materialises (P ≈ 20%)
Mag-7 EPS surprise positively, investment in AI infrastructure converts into monetisable productivity gains, and the market retroactively justifies current valuations. “This time is different” actually proves true. Semiconductors hold their plateau, and the Shiller CAPE stabilises structurally higher than the historical mean.
Fed pivot despite inflation (P ≈ 10%)
Growth fears outweigh inflation pressure and the Fed eases before declaring victory on inflation. Liquidity rescues valuations short-term, even if fundamental risks remain. A classic late-cycle rally typically lasts six to nine months before reality reasserts itself.
China stimulus surprise (P ≈ 25%)
Beijing surprisingly launches a stimulus package on the order of 5% or more of Chinese GDP. EM equities, industrial metals and cyclical DM names rally, world equity indices follow, and defensive positioning — cash, defensive sectors, long govies — underperforms by a large margin.
What would change our view
Specifically we watch four indicators: (a) Hormuz transit volume back above 15 mb/d; (b) Nvidia or Mag-7 guidance lifts the 2027 EPS consensus by more than 10%; (c) the Fed signals easing in FOMC Q&A despite CPI above 4%; (d) China's NPC announces stimulus above 5% of GDP. If two of these conditions are met, we reduce our defensive bias to neutral. If three are met, we turn constructive.
Burry bets on the break — we build capital preservation around the probability that he is right.
Asset-class views
Market views by asset class
The overview below is not a personal investment recommendation — it replaces neither a suitability check nor a conversation with your portfolio manager. It is general market commentary in the sense of Art. 73 FIDLEG and the MiFID II research definition: our house view, with transparent rationale and an explicit conviction rating. The horizon per view is six to twelve months.
| Asset class / theme | View | Conviction | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| US mega-cap tech[1],[19],[20] | Cautious | CAPE reversion risk, AI capex tail | |
| Semiconductors[19] | Cautious | 60% above 200-day; mean-reversion setup | |
| Defensives (Healthcare, Staples) | Constructive | Lower beta, stable cashflows | |
| Energy sector[7],[8] | Constructive | Functional geopolitics hedge | |
| Precious metals | Constructive | Real-rate hedge under stagflation tail | |
| CHF / JPY[17] | Constructive | Safe-haven character | |
| Bunds / DE govies | Selective constructive | Risk-off hedge; stagflation tail remains | |
| USD long bonds | Neutral | Term-premium risk vs. risk-off | |
| Cash / money market | Build up | Optionality after correction | |
| High-Yield credit[21] | Cautious | Spreads 3.1% — 2007-style complacency |
Conviction 1 = low (monitoring), 3 = medium (house view), 5 = high (core thesis). Views do not allow conclusions about concrete products or allocations for individual clients.
Watchlist
What turns before the headline
Nine indicators across three buckets — geopolitics, energy, market. They regularly turn days to weeks before the headline does. When two of the three buckets flip simultaneously — say, Hormuz below 8 mb/d and forward cover below 24 days at the same time — the move in capital markets is typically no longer avoidable.
Bottom line
Three stress lines, one defensive bias
When valuation, geopolitics and the energy buffer simultaneously sit at historic extremes, the logic of portfolio construction changes. It is no longer about capturing the last percentage points of a parabolic move — it is about preserving capital through a probable reversion.
We position our house research accordingly: US mega-cap tech and high-yield credit cautious with high conviction; energy as a functional geopolitics hedge; precious metals as a real-rate hedge in the stagflation tail; CHF and JPY as safe-haven carry. High-quality govies and money market are the building blocks with which we build optionality after a correction — not because we know the trough, but because dry powder on that exact day is what makes the difference.
Specific implementation requires the suitability assessment of each recipient. This publication is general market commentary in the sense of Art. 73 FIDLEG; it is not investment advice. We have made the data transparent, disclosed the assumptions and named the risks to our own view — everything beyond that is your decision with your adviser.
- [1]Bloomberg, Michael Burry Warns of Stock Crash as Tech Jump Echoes 2000 Peak, 11 May 2026 — Burry Substack post; SOX +66% H1 2026 — second-best H1 ever
- [2]CNBC, Trump rejects Iran peace proposal as Tehran vows to confront enemies, 11 May 2026 — US position; reopening Hormuz as precondition
- [3]Al Jazeera, Unacceptable: What's Iran's peace proposal that Trump has rejected?, 11 May 2026 — Contents of the Iranian counter-proposal
- [4]NBC News, Iran-U.S. peace talks deadlocked after Trump rejects 'totally unacceptable' proposal, 11 May 2026 — Ceasefire 'on life support'
- [5]Fortune, Iran war is draining world's oil buffer at an unprecedented pace, 9 May 2026 — ~400 mn bbl SPR releases in 2026
- [6]JPMorgan Energy Research via Investing.com, How Close Is Crude Oil to Its Operational Minimum?, May 2026 — OECD ~968 mn bbl = ~27 days forward cover; operational min 24 days
- [7]IEA, Oil Market Report — April 2026, April 2026 — Global stocks −85 mn bbl March; ex-Gulf −205 mn bbl
- [8]Goldman Sachs, How Will the Iran Conflict Impact Oil Prices?, April 2026 — Full closure no offset +$15/bbl; with SPR +$10/bbl
- [9]JPMorgan via The Deep Dive, JPMorgan sees Brent jumping $120, 25-day supply on Hormuz halt, May 2026 — $120/bbl path; Gulf saturation in 25 days
- [10]BLS, Consumer Price Index — March 2026, 10 April 2026 — US CPI +0.9% m/m, +3.3% YoY; Energy +10.9%; Gasoline +21.2% m/m
- [11]New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations, Short-Term Inflation Expectations Increase Further, 7 May 2026 — 1-year 3.6%; 3-year 3.1%; 5-year 3.0%
- [12]ECB, Staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, March 2026 — HICP projection Q2 2026: 3.1%; Q3: 2.8%
- [13]Euronews, Eurozone inflation jumps to 2.5% amid Iran war, 31 March 2026 — HICP March 2.5% (from 1.9%); Energy +4.9%; EU gas +80% YTD
- [14]fuel-prices.eu, EU Fuel Prices — 4 May 2026, 4 May 2026 — EU avg gasoline €1.809 / diesel €1.934; NL €2.37; ES €1.74
- [15]ADAC, Aktueller Spritpreis Mai 2026, 11 May 2026 — DE gasoline €1.974 / diesel €1.987 incl. fuel rebate from 1 May
- [16]EUNews.it, EU May petrol prices up 13.67% vs Feb; diesel up 23.89%, 8 May 2026 — EU pump since 28 Feb: gasoline +13.67%, diesel +23.89%
- [17]MUFG via FXStreet, EUR/USD: Energy shock and ECB delay rate response, 27 April 2026 — ECB cumulatively +50 bps from June 2026
- [18]Vanguard, Oil shock complicates central bank outlooks, May 2026 — Fed path: max 1 cut in 2026; stagflation dilemma
- [19]Benzinga, Burry's Chip Short Just Got Wilder As SOXX Hits 60% From 200DMA, May 2026 — SOX +60% above 200-day — record since ETF inception 2001
- [20]The Money Overview, Buffett Indicator 217% of GDP, CAPE 39 — last alignment March 2000, May 2026 — CAPE 39.58; Buffett 217%; triple signal
- [21]Convex Trade, The Complacency Trade — Credit Spreads at 2007-style Tights, April 2026 — HY OAS 3.12-3.28%; tight credit vs VIX 28
- [22]AInvest / Sundial Capital Research, SOX 10% Surge: Flow Dynamics vs Burry's Bubble Warning, May 2026 — S&P record with only 5% 52-w lows — 4th occurrence historically
- [23]Reuters via IEA, World faces largest-ever oil supply disruption on Middle East war, 12 March 2026 — Hormuz flow ~20 mb/d → ~3.8 mb/d
- [24]BLS, Schedule of Releases for the Consumer Price Index, 2026 Release Schedule — May CPI release scheduled for 10 June 2026, 8:30 ET
- [25]NVIDIA Investor Relations, NVIDIA 1st Quarter FY27 Financial Results, 20 May 2026 — Q1 FY27 results at approx. 13:20 PT; conference call 14:00 PT
- [26]BEA, Personal Income and Outlays — April 2026 release, 28 May 2026 — April Personal Income and Outlays / PCE release scheduled for 8:30 ET
- [27]ECB, Governing Council monetary policy meeting, 11 June 2026 — Monetary-policy decision and Lagarde press conference
- [28]OPEC, OPEC+ June output decision and follow-up meeting, May/June 2026 — Virtual OPEC+ process; no Vienna meeting assumed
- [29]Federal Reserve, FOMC calendar — June 2026 meeting, 16-17 June 2026 — Statement 17 June 2026, 14:00 ET; Powell press conference follows
Valuation, inflation and Brent paths are modelled bands based on publicly available data. They do not assume any particular outcome of the Iran conflict and are not a point forecast. The probabilities in the scenario tables are subjective LegaFund estimates; they are not implied by the options market. The waterfall risk attribution follows a standard decomposition: multiple compression from a CAPE reversion to 30; EPS revisions from a 25% AI-capex normalisation assumption; risk premium from the Brent path differential; stagflation tail from a 1970s episode analysis adjusted for survivorship bias.
This publication is addressed exclusively to professional and institutional clients within the meaning of FIDLEG (Switzerland) and MiFID II (EU) and does not replace personal advice. It serves information purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer, a recommendation or a solicitation to buy or sell any financial instrument. No suitability or appropriateness assessment is performed in respect of the recipient. Past performance is not an indication of future results, and market developments may differ materially from the models described here.
Conflicts of interest: employees or affiliated persons may hold positions in the topics discussed here. Disclosure of any proprietary positions is available on request. LegaFund AG is obliged under FIDLEG to inform about conflicts of interest — we fulfil that obligation in full transparency.
© 2026 LegaFund AG · Research Desk · Cross-Asset Strategy · LF-CAS-2026-05-12-EN